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Suing for Small Potatoes: Consumer
Class Action Waivers in Arbitration
Agreements Distinguished by the
Ninth Circuit
Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, arbitration agreements relating to credit cards, loans,
cell phones and other electronic devices have increased in prevalence. Some
companies are seeking to use class arbitration waivers to shield themselves from
liability, both in court and in arbitration. 2 "While many courts have allowed com-
panies to use [such] arbitration clauses ...an increasing number are striking
[down these] clauses as unconscionable." 3 The federal circuit courts are divided
on this issue, but the courts finding class arbitration waivers enforceable have
often done so on the premise that the imbalances of the agreement are not so egre-
gious as to be found unconscionable. The courts finding the agreements to be
unenforceable often rely heavily on a policy of reasonableness and fairness.
In Shroyer, the Ninth Circuit laid a foundation for looking at consumer class
action arbitration waivers with greater scrutiny, using a much narrower test. In
doing so, it communicates a clear message to large corporations that arbitration
agreements that include class action waivers for the purpose of cheating consum-
ers out of small amounts of money will not be tolerated. This case note will ad-
dress the significance of the Ninth Circuit's decision and the policy arguments
supporting such an approach.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 2004, Cingular Wireless LLC and AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. merged
to form New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc. (Cingular).4 Kennith Shroyer, a
former AT&T customer, noticed that his cellular phone service declined dramati-
cally following the merger.5 When Shroyer and others complained to Cingular
about the decline in service, the company requested they transfer their service
plans and equipment from AT&T to Cingular.6 On January 2, 2005, Shroyer en-
tered into a new contract with Cingular, assenting to the terms of the agreement
1. 498 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2007).
2. Jean R. Stemlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Ac-
tions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75 (2004).
3. Id. at 76.
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over the phone with an electronic signature.7 The agreement included an arbitra-
tion clause and a class arbitration waiver. 8 The waiver stated: "You and Cingular
agree that you and Cingular may bring claims against the other only in your or its
individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class
or representative proceeding."
9
On February 22, 2006, Shroyer filed a class action lawsuit against Cingular
seeking damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief related to injuries suf-
fered as a result of the merger and the actions of Cingular following the merger.
10
Shroyer alleged that Cingular told him it could provide former AT&T customers
with a computer chip that would improve phone service quality, but in order to
receive the chip, they would be required to extend their contracts by entering into
service contracts with Cingular.1 Further, Shroyer and the other class members
alleged that they were told they would not be able to retain the more favorable
rates of their previous AT&T contracts.12 Once Shroyer filed suit, Cingular filed a
motion to compel arbitration and stay further proceedings in the litigation. 13 The
company argued that the arbitration clause was valid and enforceable because it
was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable.' 4  Alternatively, it
argued that finding the clause unconscionable would frustrate the purpose of the
Federal Arbitration Act, which expressly and impliedly preempted a finding of
unconscionability. 5 The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California
granted Cingular's motion to compel arbitration and dismissed the action without
prejudice. 16 "Shroyer filed a timely notice of appeal" of the District Court's order
compelling arbitration.17
Applying state contract law, the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit found
that when parties enter into a consumer contract of adhesion in which disputes
typically involve small amounts of damages, and the consumer plaintiff alleges
that the party with superior bargaining power intended to cheat consumers out of
individually small sums, a class arbitration waiver is unconscionable and, there-
fore, unenforceable. 18 Furthermore, the Court of Appeals found that holding class
7. Id. Shroyer selected "yes" in response to the statement, "You agree to the terms as stated in the
Wireless Service Agreement and the terms of service." Id.
8. Id. at 979-80. The arbitration clause included the following language: "Cingular and you ...
agree to arbitrate all disputes and claims... arising out of or relating to this Agreement, or to any prior
oral or written agreement, for Equipment or services between Cingular and you." Id. at 980.
9. Id. (emphasis added).
10. Id. at 979. Shroyer pled seven causes of action in total: (1) unfair competition; (2) untrue and
misleading advertising; (3) violations of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act; (4) breach of contract;




13. Id. at 980.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 980-81.
16. Id. The district court entered Cingular's proposed Order Compelling Arbitration and Dismiss-
ing the Action Without Prejudice without making any changes or additions. Id.
17. Id. On appeal, Cingular argued that Shroyer had meaningful alternatives to entering into a con-
tract with Cingular, therefore the contract was not unconscionable. Id. at 985. Additionally, it con-
tended that the class arbitration waiver was not substantively unconscionable because the agreement
provided that Cingular would pay the attorneys fees. Id. at 986.
18. Id. at 983.
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arbitration waivers unconscionable did not frustrate the purposes of the Federal
Arbitration Act.19
Ill. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to end judicial
hostility toward arbitration and place agreements to arbitrate "upon the same foot-
ing as other contracts." 20 The FAA states that an agreement in writing to submit
to arbitration "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 21 The
FAA also required courts to enforce arbitration agreements as agreed to by the
parties.
22
Beginning in the early 1980s, the Supreme Court took a position strongly fa-
voting arbitration.23 As a result, standard form adhesion contracts including
agreements to arbitrate have proliferated in the consumer credit, service, finance,
banking, and employment industries. 24 The Supreme Court provided, however,
that generally applicable state contract defenses, such as unconscionability, were
appropriate grounds for revoking an arbitration agreement.25 Generally, to be
unconscionable and therefore unenforceable, an agreement must be both procedu-
rally and substantively unconscionable. 26 A contract is procedurally unenforcea-
ble if it is a contract of adhesion, a standardized instrument drafted by the party of
superior bargaining strength and offered as a "take-it-or-leave-it" option to the
weaker party.27 Substantive unconscionability focuses on the one-sidedness of the
contract terms, favoring the stronger party.
28
Consumer plaintiffs have challenged class arbitration waivers with only some
success. Five federal circuit courts have upheld class arbitration waivers on vari-
ous grounds. 29 Two circuit courts have ruled in favor of consumer plaintiffs, find-
19. Id. at 990.
20. Clyde W. Summers, Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights, Compelling the Unwil-
ling to Arbitrate, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 685, 685 (2004) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1
(1924)).
21. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
22. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006).
23. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). The FAA estab-
lished a "'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements' that impelled lower courts to gene-
rously interpret arbitration agreements, liberally construe statues to allow arbitration of rights created
by those statutes, and deferentially review arbitration awards .... " Summers, supra note 20, at 685
(quoting Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24).
24. Summers, supra note 20, at 685.
25. Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 685-86 (1996) (quoting Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995)).
26. Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2007).
27. Id. at 982 (quoting Discover Bank v. Superior Bank, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (2005)).
28. Id.
29. Kathleen M. Scanlon, Class Arbitration Waivers: The "Severability" Doctrine and its Conse-
quences, 62 DisP. RESOL. J. 40, 43 (2007) (citing Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366 (3rd
Cir. 2000); Snowden v. Checkpoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631 (4th Cir. 2002); Livingston v. Assoc.
Fin. Inc., 339 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 2003); Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance, 400 F.3d 868 (11 th Cir.
2005); Iberia Credit Bureau v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159 (5th Cir. 2004)).
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ing class arbitration waivers unenforceable due to unconscionability. 30 The re-
maining four circuits have yet to address the subject in their highest courts, while
the lower courts have demonstrated inconsistency in their rulings.
31
A. Courts Finding Consumer Class Action Waivers Enforceable
In Snowden v. Checkpoint Check Cashing,32 a borrower brought a class action
against Checkpoint Cashing, a deferred deposit check cashing lender, asserting
violations of the Truth in Lending Act and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations Act.33 Checkpoint Cashing argued that the plaintiffs were barred from
bringing a class action claim by the class action waiver they had signed in an arbi-
tration agreement.34 In response, the plaintiffs argued that the agreement was
unconscionable. 35 The Fourth Circuit held that the class arbitration waiver was
not unconscionable. 36 While the court did not articulate a test for unconscionabili-
ty, it impliedly balanced the provisions of the agreement and held that it was not
unduly one-sided.37 The court implied that to hold otherwise would negate the
purposes of the FAA.38 Finally, the Fourth Circuit rejected Snowden's argument
that forcing consumers to arbitrate was against public policy.
39
In Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC,4° a Fifth Circuit case,
cell phone customers brought a class action against service providers alleging
deceptive billing practices and asserting claims for breach of contract.41 The ser-
vice providers filed motions to com!el arbitration pursuant to the arbitration42
agreements and stay the proceedings, while the plaintiffs argued the arbitration
clauses were unenforceable. 43 The court stated that in order to be found uncons-
cionable, the provisions "must possess features of both adhesionary formation and
unduly harsh substance." 44 The court ruled that while the cell phone contract was
adhesionary, the arbitration clause did not "leave the plaintiffs without remedies
or so oppress them as to rise to the level of unconscionability." '' The Fifth Circuit
couched its ruling within the context of the FAA, stating, "state courts are not
permitted to employ those general doctrines in ways that subject arbitration claus-
30. See Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006); Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th
Cir. 2003).
31. Scanlon, supra note 29, at 43.
32. 290 F.3d 631 (4th Cir. 2002).
33. Id. at 633-34.
34. Id. at 634, 636.
35. Id. at 638.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 639 (finding Snowden's argument unfounded because attorney's fees were recovera-
ble by a prevailing plaintiff).
38. Id.
39. Id. "Snowden has presented no authority or evidence establishing that the arbitral forum con-
templated by the FAA and provided in the Arbitration Agreement is inconsistent with public policy
relating to consumer protection." Id.
40. 379 F.3d 159 (5th Cir. 2004).
41. Id. at 162.
42. Id.
43. Id at 166. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the bar on collective proceedings effectively
immunized the defendants from low-value claims. Id. at 174.
44. Id. at 167.
45. Id. at 175.
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es to special scrutiny."46 The court reasoned that although arbitration may limit
certain litigation devices, such as class action suits, this limit adds to arbitration's
ability to offer efficient adjudication of claims. 47
B. Courts Finding Consumer Class Action Waiver Unenforceable
In Ting v. AT&T,48 consumers brought a class action against AT&T under the
Unfair Practices Act. 49 The court applied a standard unconscionability test, look-
ing for both procedural unconscionability in the form of a contract of adhesion
and substantive unconscionability in the one-sidedness of the terms.50 The Ninth
Circuit found the terms of the arbitration agreement sufficiently one-sided to be
unconscionable because AT&T would never bring a class action against its own
customers. 51 It concluded that a finding of unconscionability was not "inherently
hostile" to arbitration, but fit within the FAA's particular rule that contract de-
fenses may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without violating § 2 of
the FAA.5
The First Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit in Kristian v. Comcast Corp.,53
holding a class arbitration waiver between a cable television company and its
customers unenforceable and allowing the plaintiffs to proceed with a class action
based on antitrust law. 54  Kristian distinguished itself from Ting, however, by
finding that upholding such class arbitration waivers would undermine plaintiffs'
ability to vindicate their statutory rights, by limiting the plaintiffs' ability to use
class mechanisms, among other things.55 At the same time, it recognized that an
unconscionability argument would lead to the same conclusion.56
In 2005, the Supreme Court of California tackled the issue of whether class
arbitration waivers were unenforceable on unconscionability grounds, laying the
foundation for the Ninth Circuit's approach in Shroyer. In Discover Bank v. Su-
perior Court,57 the Supreme Court of California formulated a three-part test to
46. Id. at 167.
47. Id. at 174 (citing Gilner v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31(1991)).
48. 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003).
49. Id. at 1130.
50. Id. at 1148. In analyzing substantive unconscionability, the court examined whether the arbitra-
tion agreement demonstrated a "modicum of bilaterality," looking beyond facial neutrality and assess-
ing the actual effects of the challenged provisions. Id. at 1149 (quoting Armendariz v. Found. Health
Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669,691 (Cal. 2000)).
51. Id. at 1150 (quoting Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002))
("[I]t is difficult to envision the circumstances under which the provision might negatively impact
[defendant] Discover [Card], because credit card companies typically do not sue their customers in
class-action lawsuits.").
52. Id. at 1152.
53. 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006).
54. Id at 59.
55. See id. at 60, 64-65. Plaintiffs argued that the arbitration agreements did not allow them to vin-
dicate their statutory rights because the agreements "(1) provide for limited discovery; (2) establish a
shortened statute of limitations period; (3) bar recovery of treble damages; (4) prevent recovery of
attorney's fees; and (5) prohibit the use of class mechanisms." Id. at 37.
56. Id. at 63 ("As a practical matter, there are striking similarities between the vindication of statu-
tory rights analysis and the unconscionability analysis. In fact, many of the Plaintiffs' unconscionabili-
ty arguments are merely reiterations of their vindication of statutory rights arguments.").
57. 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
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determine the validity of a class arbitration waiver. 58 A waiver of class arbitration
is unconscionable when it (1) appears in a consumer contract of adhesion; (2)
occurs in a setting in which disputes between contracting parties often involve
small amounts of damages; and (3) 'is alleged that the party with superior bargain-
ing power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of con-
sumers out of individually small sums of money...."59
Since the Discover Bank decision and development of the three-part test, Cal-
ifornia federal district courts have used the test to find arbitration agreements with
class arbitration waivers both enforceable and unenforceable. In Provencher v.
Dell,61 the federal district court enforced Dell's arbitration clause and class action
waiver against a personal computer buyer who alleged that Dell had breached its
extended warranty. 62 The court found that the criteria in Discover Bank were not
met, one reason being that the damages sought for breach of the extended warran-
ty were significantly more than the "small amount" required by the Discover Bank
test. 63 In Janda v. T-Mobile, U.S.A., 64 the court found the arbitration clause to be
unconscionable because it fulfilled the Discover Bank test and was indistinguisha-
ble from the facts of Discover Bank. 5
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant decision, Plaintiff Shroyer argued that the district court erred in
finding the arbitration agreement he signed with New Cingular Wireless not un-
conscionable, emphasizing that the court had previously found class action preclu-
sion clauses unconscionable and unenforceable. 66 Shroyer did not specifically
advocate the use of the Discover Bank test, but did cite Discover Bank and another
California state court decision that applied the test. 67 The Ninth Circuit Court
chose to apply the three-part Discover Bank test and determined that the class
arbitration waiver was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.
68
Since Cingular did not offer customers an opportunity to negotiate the terms
of the cell phone agreement but presented them with a take-it-or-leave-it contract,
the court found it to be a contract of adhesion.69 Shroyer and other members of
the class suffered damages in the hundreds of dollars at most, in amounts small
58. Id. at 1107-10. See generally Monica T. Nelson, Comment, Discover Bank v. Superior Court:
The Unconscionability of Classwide Arbitration Waivers in California, 30 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 649
(2007).
59. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110.
60. Charles B. Casper, Arbitration Agreements and Class Action Lawsuits, SL081 A.L.I. 1455,
1463 (2006).
61. 409 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (S.D. Cal. 2006).
62. Id. at 1205-06.
63. Id. at 1201-02.
64. No. C 05-03729, 2006 WL 708936 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2006).
65. Id. at *6-*7.
66. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 3-4, Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless, 498 F.3d 976 (9th Cir.
2007) (No. 06-55964), 2006 WL 4040436.
67. Id. (citing Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005) and Cohen v. DirecTV, Inc.,
48 Cal Rptr. 3d 813, 821-23 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)).
68. Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless, 498 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2007).
69. Id. at 983-84.
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enough to satisfy the second element of the Discover Bank test.70 Finally, Shroy-
er's complaint clearly alleged that Cingular intended to "cheat large numbers of
consumers out of individually small sums of money," thereby satisfying the third
element of the test.71 The court concluded that, because all three parts of the Dis-
cover Bank test were satisfied, Cingular's class arbitration waiver was both proce-
durally and substantively unconscionable and therefore, unenforceable,.72
The court quickly struck down Cingular's argument that there was no proce-
dural unconscionability because Shroyer failed to demonstrate a lack of meaning-
ful choices.7 3 It cited a recent appellate court decision, stating that "'absent [ex-
traordinary] circumstances, use of a contract of adhesion establishes a minimal
degree of procedural unconscionability .... , Further, Cingular contended that
the class action waiver was not substantively unconscionable because it did not
wholly insulate Cingular from liability in that it provided for attorney's fees.75
The court stated, however, that "[t]here is no indication ... that, in the case of
small individual recovery, attorney's fees are an adequate substitute for the class
action or [class] arbitration mechanism[s]. 76
The court also found that the FAA did not preempt a holding of procedural
and substantive unconscionability.77 The Act did not prevent federal or state
courts from applying general state contract law principles.78 Furthermore, it did
not appear to frustrate or undermine the original purpose of the FAA-to "rev-
ers[e] hostility to arbitration and plac[e] arbitration agreements on the same foot-
ing as ordinary contracts ... In fact, it can be seen to encourage the purposes
of the FAA by requiring Cingular to permit its customers to bring class arbitration
proceedings.80 Finally, because the court could find that "class arbitration [would
be] simpler, cheaper, and faster for both the consumers and the defendant compa-
ny," permitting class arbitration would "further the FAA's purpose of encouraging
70. Id. at 984. In Discover Bank, the plaintiff sought to recover a $29 fee charged for late payments
and other finance charges. In Cohen, damages amounted to $1000, which the court found were small
enough to satisfy the Discover Bank test. The monthly service fee that Cingular charged to Shroyer
was $59.99 per month on his first account and $9.99 per month on his second account. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 985. See also Brief for the Appellees at 11, Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless, Inc., 498
F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-55964), 2006 WL 4040437. Cingular argued that Shroyer was re-
quired to show evidence of surprise or oppression: either that "(i) he could not have obtained the good
or service at issue from a competitor without agreeing to the challenged term; (ii) the subject of the
contract involved a necessity of life; or (iii) the challenged term was imposed after the weaker party
already had become dependent on the relationship." Id. at 10.
74. Shroyer, 498 F.3d at 985 (quoting Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344, 355-56
(Cal Ct. App. 2007)).
75. Brief for the Appellees, supra note 73, at 11. Cingular argued that it had ensured that individu-
al arbitration provides a "realistic means of obtaining redress for small claims by agreeing to pay the
full cost" of arbitration. Id.
76. Shroyer, 498 F.3d at 986 (quoting Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal.
2005)).
77. Id. at 987.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 990.
80. Id. at 990-91.
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By employing the Discover Bank test for unconscionability, the Shroyer court
adopted a narrower test to apply specifically to consumer class arbitration waivers.
More importantly, it added to traditional unconscionability analysis, used by other
circuits in finding class arbitration waivers enforceable and unenforceable. The
Shroyer decision raises several policy questions about the role courts should play
in the treatment and use of arbitration agreements and their relationship with the
Federal Arbitration Act.
A. The Ninth Circuit's New Approach
Prior to Shroyer, the Ninth Circuit approached unconscionability of class ar-
bitration waivers much like the other circuit courts.83 In Ting v. AT&T, 84 the court
found a consumer class action waiver unenforceable because it was part of a con-
tract of adhesion and lacked bilaterality. 85 Shroyer articulated these traditional
principles of procedural and substantive unconscionability, but it went a step fur-
ther than Ting by requiring the Discover Bank test to specifically apply to con-
sumer contracts of adhesion. 86 The first element of the Discover Bank test is es-
sentially identical to the traditional procedural unconscionability principle.8 7
While courts had expressed concerns in Ting, and other cases, that it was not eco-
nomically feasible to pursue consumer claims on an individual basis because of
their characteristically small amount of damages, Shroyer, using Discover Bank,
made this concern the integral part of the second element.88 This element corre-
lates substantially to an effects analysis of substantive unconscionability that
many courts apply, but couches it in terms specifically addressing consumer con-
tracts.8 9 The third element of the test injects traditional unconscionability analysis
with a strong and much-needed consumer protection policy. 90 While the Califor-
nia courts had already taken the lead in finding class action waivers in arbitration
agreements unconscionable, 91 in adopting the Discover Bank test, the Ninth Cir-
cuit sends an unmistakable message to large corporations that the enforceability of
arbitration agreements will be closely examined.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 993.
83. See Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1148-52 (9th Cir. 2003).
84. 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003).
85. Id. at 1148-49.
86. See Shroyer, 498 F.3d at 983-84.
87. E.g., Ting, 319 F.3d at 1148 ("A contract is procedurally unconscionable if it is a contract of
adhesion .... "). See Shroyer, 498 F.3d at 983 ( "[Whether the agreement is 'a consumer contract of
adhesion' drafted by a party that has superior bargaining power ... ").
88. Shroyer, 498 F.3d at 983 ("[Wlhether the agreement occurs 'in a setting in which disputes be-
tween the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages'...
89. See Ting, 319 F.3d at 1149.
90. Shroyer, 498 F.3d at 984.
91. Casper, supra note 60, at 1462.
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The Ninth Circuit made it clear that the new test, however, would not super-
sede traditional unconscionability doctrine, but rather add to conventional analy-
sis. 9 2 Most significantly, it recognized that there will be instances when a class
action waiver is unconscionable and the Discover Bank test is not satisfied.93
B. Consumer Protection Policy in Action
The application of the narrow Discover Bank test to consumer class action
waivers serves several important public policy goals. First, it gives individuals an
opportunity to truly vindicate their rights. Class actions serve to inform potential
plaintiffs who are unaware of the alleged illegal activities and would otherwise not
commence any proceedings. 94 Further, even consumers who are aware of prob-
lems with their contract may run into trouble attracting representation due to their
small monetary claims, thereby deterring them from filing a claim at all.95 "Al-
though a consumer can pursue arbitration without a lawyer, he or she would be at
a [significant] disadvantage and might well lack basic information about how to• .96
initiate such a proceeding .... A class action provides financial feasibility by
combining small claims and surmounts the average consumer's lack of informa-
tion regarding the filing of claims in general.97
Critics argue that a large volume of class actions would be detrimental to the
court system, but class actions are a vital part of the legal system. From an effi-
ciency standpoint, class actions resolve a large number of individual disputes at
one time, as opposed to using a case-by-case approach.98 This would benefit de-
fendant companies also, provided that they do not engage in illegal activity, be-
cause it would be a quicker and cheaper method of establishing the validity of
their conduct once and for all.99 If the company did indeed engage in illegal con-
duct, it follows that it would not want to allow a class action, which would be
much more costly. 100
While courts that have invalidated consumer class action waivers are con-
cerned with the plaintiffs' ability to seek recovery, it is by no means their sole
concern. Perhaps even more importantly, these courts recognize that class actions
serve to deter companies and creditors who might seek to take advantage of con-
92. See Shroyer, 498 F.3d at 982-83.
93. AL at 983.
94. Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jenson, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer Class Ac-
tions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & COMTEMP. PROBS. 75, 89
(2004). It can be deduced that this one of the many reasons companies seek to prohibit class actions in
the first place. E.g., Ting, 319 F.3d 1126.
95. Stemlight & Jenson, supra note 94, at 89-90. This is particularly true for "payday loan" class
members who probably lack the financial means to hire an attorney for a small claim. Id. at 89-90
n.98.
96. ld. at 89-90 n.98.
97. Jd at 89-90.
98. See generally Stemlight & Jenson, supra note 94.
99. Id. at 92-93 n.108. It is hard to imagine a scenario where a consumer plaintiff alleges the de-
fendant company intended to cheat consumers out of small amounts of money, and a class action
would not be the best approach. If the plaintiffs' allegations are wrong, the company wins big. If the
company loses, plaintiffs receive vindication of their rights.
100. Id. at 92-93 n.108.
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sumers as a whole. 0 1 As the court in Szetela v. Discover Bank put it: "the poten-
tial for millions of customers to be overcharged small amounts without an effec-
tive method of redress cannot be ignored."'1 2 To allow companies to bind indi-
viduals to an ineffective forum for recovery significantly compromises consumer
rights. Shroyer keeps this important policy at the forefront of its analysis by using
the Discover Bank test.
C. Eliminating Vague Standards
As courts have increasingly found arbitration agreements to be unconsciona-
ble, criticism has surfaced that the courts misuse the unconscionability doctrine by
focusing on reasonableness and fairness standards. 10 3 As a result, critics argue
that these vague standards result in "treating arbitration agreements less favorably
than other contracts," contravening the Federal Arbitration Act.' °4 Shroyer, in
employing a decisively narrow test, effectively eliminates controversial vague-
ness. The Ninth Circuit's use of a narrow three-part-test effectively puts to rest
discrepancies among lower courts in determining whether consumer class action
waivers are unconscionable. It is important to note that the Ninth Circuit does not
mandate that all consumer class action waivers may be found unconscionable by
way of the Discover Bank test, but rather, it applies only to a narrow class of these
consumer class action waivers. 105 The third element of the Discover Bank test
allows courts to take a strong position in protecting consumer plaintiffs without
interfering with the unconscionability analysis of class action waiver agreements
related to employment contracts, which present an entirely different set of issues.
It also does not apply to cases that involve significantly higher damages, nor those
cases in which the plaintiff does not allege corporate intent to defraud consumers.
The pool of cases to which the Discover Test applies is quite small.
It is less clear, however, whether the Shroyer court truly eliminated fairness
and reasonable standards. Embedded within the Discover Bank test is an assump-
tion that prohibiting class action litigation and arbitration is, at the very least un-
fair, due to the inherently small amounts of individual claims which provide a
disincentive for individual plaintiffs to bring suit. 106 When addressing the issue of
unconscionability, critics suggest the real question is whether the class action
prohibition leads to a "gross disparity in the values exchanged" in the contract.1
0 7
However, even the "gross disparity" approach plays on an idea of fairness by im-
plying that relatively equal exchanges in value indicate the prohibition is not un-
conscionable. When it comes to unconscionability, it is likely impossible to avoid
101. J. Maria Glover, Beyond Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and Mandatory Arbitration
Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REv. 1735, 1758 (2006).
102. Stemlight & Jenson, supra note 94, at 81 (quoting Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d
862, 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002)).
103. Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption, Contract
Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469, 486.
104. l
105. Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless, Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 983 (9th Cir. 2007) (see Discover Bank
test elements).
106. Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005).
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issues of unfairness altogether: the common definition of unconscionable includes
the description "shockingly unfair or unjust. ' 10 8 Whether the Discover Bank test
is colored by fairness and reasonable standards is overshadowed by a greater need
for consumer protection policy goals and tempered by its narrow application.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States Circuit Courts and state courts have failed to create a uni-
fied body of law regarding consumer class action waivers and their validity. Sev-
eral circuits, in applying traditional unconscionability principles, have found con-
sumer class action waivers to be enforceable because they do not present signifi-
cant differences in the value of the terms of the agreement. Other courts have
rested findings of unconscionability on the inability of plaintiffs to effectively
arbitrate their claims. Shroyer steps out on a limb by applying the Discover Bank
test and employs a common sense policy of protection for consumer plaintiffs.
While the United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the soundness of the
Discover Bank Test, it is likely the Court will address this issue in the future, par-
ticularly if an increasing number of courts apply the Discover Bank test in finding
consumer class action waivers unconscionable. ° 9 Until the Supreme Court gives
more guidance, the Ninth Circuit remains the strongest voice against consumer
class action waivers in the court system.
JAIMEE CONLEY
108. Meriam-Webster's Online Dictionary - Unconscionable, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/unconscionable (last visited March 28, 2008).
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